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ABSTRACT 
Twelve Pacific Rim countries that account for forty percent of world output and more 
than a quarter of world trade have signed a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. 
Assuming that the agreement is ratified and implemented by the signatory countries, the 
TPP will have important implications for the world trading system. New ground is broken 
in this mega-regional agreement in a number of areas where progress has not yet been pos-
sible in the more comprehensive World Trade Organization negotiations. This paper provides 
an analysis of the innovations in the agreement, assesses their significance for the broader 
world trade regime, and considers the feasibility of extending them to the multilateral trad-
ing system. Synergistic effects on other ongoing mega-regional negotiations are also consid-
ered. 
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2. INTRODUCTION
on 4 february 2016, twelve pacific rim countries signed the trans-pacific 
partnership agreement (tpp). signatories of this agreement include the United 
states and Japan, two of the three largest economies in the world. together the twelve 
member countries account for approximately forty percent of world gross domestic 
product (gdp) and twenty-six percent of global trade, making this potentially the 
largest regional trading agreement to date. It is a comprehensive agreement, ad-
dressing a wide range of trade-related issues, comprising thirty chapters and 5,000 
pages. the agreement will enter into force whenever it has been ratified by all of the 
signatory countries if that happens within two years. If not all countries ratify the 
agreement within the two year period, it will enter into force after being ratified by at 
least six countries accounting for at least eighty-five percent of the combined gdp of 
the signatory countries. 
2. BACKGROUND
the trans-pacific partnership agreement is the outgrowth of a much smaller 
agreement among Brunei, chile, new Zealand and singapore, the trans-pacific 
strategic economic partnership agreement that was signed in 2005. In 2008 the 
United states joined first the financial services and investment negotiations, and 
later the same year entered into comprehensive negotiations. also in 2008, austral-
ia, peru and vietnam were invited and joined. malaysia was invited to join in 2010, 
as was south Korea. malaysia elected to join the negotiations but south Korea de-
clined. the significance of the tpp was greatly enhanced by Japan’s decision to join 
the negotiations in 2012. the twelve signatory countries are the United states, Japan, 
singapore, Brunei, new Zealand, chile, australia, peru, vietnam, malaysia, mexico, 
and canada. 
motivations for the agreement were both economic and geopolitical. progress 
toward trade liberalization at the multilateral level through the doha round negotia-
tions had stalled. Before the Uruguay round agreements of the 1990s, multilateral 
trade negotiations had been dominated by the United states, canada, the european 
Union and Japan,1 with the least developed countries free-riding on the trade liber-
alization and little being demanded of them.2 that dynamic changed when the Uru-
guay round agreements were presented as a “single undertaking,” with all members 
1  “…the gatt was all about exchanges of market access, so market-size was the coinage of the realm. In the 
gatt period, the United states, european Union, Japan, and canada—known as the Quad—dominated on 
this metric, accounting for two-thirds of world imports” (Baldwin, 2016: 107).
2  “for most of gatt’s history, developing countries played only a marginal role, with few concessions 
made and few gains received. the domination of the Us and its Western allies, in the gatt multilateral 
trade negotiation was challenged for the first time in the Uruguay round. (liang, 2016: 400). see also, 
narlikar (2003).
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of the newly-formed World trade organization expected to abide by all the provi-
sions. since that time, the number of effectively participating players in world trade 
talks has increased greatly, making agreement at the multilateral level extremely 
challenging. Instead, trade liberalization during the past fifteen years, which has 
been very significant, has occurred at either the unilateral or regional levels (Bald-
win, 2016). that being the case, mega-regional agreements such as the tpp have 
great appeal. not only are they viewed as the most effective way to achieve significant 
liberalization, but also are viewed as a way to begin crafting rules in new areas that 
could eventually serve as a template for global trade and investment relations within 
the multilateral framework.
on a geopolitical level, the United states has gradually come to realize the grow-
ing importance of asia on the global stage. In terms of economic growth, asia is the 
most dynamic region of the world.3 china’s growing economic and political weight 
has raised concerns in both the United states and in china’s neighboring countries, 
particularly after china’s provocative projections of military activities and sovereignty 
claims in the south china sea. partly for this reason, the philippines, thailand, taiwan, 
south Korea and Indonesia have all expressed interest in possibly joining the tpp, as 
has colombia for different reasons. Beyond the anticipated gains from trade and in-
vestment liberalization, a major motivation for United states participation in the tpp 
was to demonstrate its commitment to the asian region (dawson, 2015). membership 
is potentially open to all 21 of the asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec) coun-
tries, and to countries outside the region if approved by member countries.
3. STANDARD FEATURES OF THE TPP AGREEMENT
In general, the tpp embodies the usual principles of the World trade organiza-
tion such as nondiscrimination, transparency and reciprocity (dawson, 2015). how-
ever, there are long lists in the annexes to the agreement of nonconforming meas-
ures, particularly for services, exempting countries from having to abide by the terms 
of the overall agreement in specific areas.4 after becoming embodied in the agree-
ment, these nonconforming measures may be very difficult to unwind and could lead 
3  Between 2006 and 2015, the average annual growth rate of gross domestic product was 8.0% in 
emerging and developing asia, in contrast to 1.4% in advanced economies, 3.5% in the commonwealth 
of Independent states, 3.1% in emerging and developing europe, 3.4% in latin america and the 
caribbean, 4.4% in the middle east, north africa, afghanistan and pakistan, and 5.8% in sub-saharan 
africa (pasquali, 2015).
4  for example, in the United states, foreign companies cannot acquire oil and gas pipelines crossing federal 
lands, foreign airlines are restricted from offering domestic air services, and only registered Us persons 
may offer bus or trucking services. In australia, notification and approval by the government is required 
for investments in a variety of industries, transmission quotas are permitted for local content on radio and 
television broadcasts, and patent attorneys must be resident in australia to offer services there. Japan reserves 
the right to limit the number of licenses to engage in various types of businesses, and also reserves the right to 
maintain restrictions on supply of services to broadcasting and space industries (Ustr, 20165b).
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to similar exclusions for countries acceding to the agreement in the future. rather 
than having so many exclusions, liberalization with long phase-in periods where 
necessary would have been preferred (scissors, 2015).
With regard to import tariffs, the tpp provides for the eventual elimination of 
all non-agriculturaltariffs, albeit with long phase-in periods for sensitive products. 
three-quarters of import tariffs will be eliminated immediately upon implemen-
tation of the agreement, as will an estimated ninety-nine percent in the long run 
(freund, moran, oliver, 2016). Industrial tariffs are relatively insignificant for most 
products among the economically advanced members of the group, but are signifi-
cant barriers still in developing countries such as vietnam. removal of these tariffs 
will expand trade with attendant improvements in economic efficiency. 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products is politically difficult in most 
countries, and for that reason the gains made in the tpp, while significant, are lim-
ited. substantial concessions were made by Japan with regard to soybeans, beef and 
pork, but not for corn and rice. all of the tpp countries opened up their agricultural 
markets to some extent. even though the United states is the world’s largest exporter 
of agricultural goods, it did little to liberalize its agricultural trade in the tpp. trade-
distortive agricultural subsidies remain in place, as do quotas on sugar. (hendrix 
and Kotschwar, 2016) Beef tariffs are phased out only after 15 years, and dairy tariffs 
only after 30 years5. canada’s highly trade-distortive supply management system for 
dairy and poultry products remains in place. (hendrix and Koschwar, 2016) 
some progress is made in the tpp toward freeing-up government procurement. 
most countries have regulations designed to direct government agency purchases to 
domestic firms. the World trade organization’s agreement on government pro-
curement (agp) that attempts to open government procurement to outside firms is a 
plurilateral agreement to which only five of the twelve tpp countries subscribe. these 
five countries did not make significant new commitments in the tpp negotiations. the 
governmental agencies of the seven countries that do not subscribe to the agp will be 
more open to foreign suppliers because of the tpp, although many exceptions are writ-
ten into the agreement. little or no progress was made to free up purchases of subna-
tional governmental agencies. nevertheless, the progress made in the agreement could 
provide a foundation for further progress in subsequent negotiations, and as additional 
countries possibly accede to the tpp agreement in the future (moran, 2016).
International trade in services is an important and growing component of in-
ternational commerce, especially for developed countries such as the United states 
and canada. the tpp agreement provides for considerable liberalization of servic-
es trade, particularly in the cases of Japan, vietnam and malaysia. eight of the tpp 
countries are currently involved in plurilateral negotiations with 15 other countries 
5  article 24 of the general agreement on tariffs and trade requires that preferential trade agreements 
remove tariffs on “substantially all of trade” among the participating countries “in a reasonable period 
of time,” defined generally as not exceeding 10 years (gatt, 1994). one must wonder if a 15-30 year 
timeframe for phase-in is a reasonable period of time. 
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(42 if the european Union countries are counted separately) to establish a trade in 
services agreement that could be completed in 2016. If completed, this agreement 
would include most of the services trade liberalization agreed in the tpp, but four 
of the member countries (malaysia, vietnam, Brunei and singapore) are not part 
of these broader negotiations (hufbauer, 2016b). a troublesome aspect of the tpp 
services agreement is that there are extensive lists of nonconforming measures that 
sometimes negate proposed liberalizations. these particularly hinder liberalization 
of trade in financial and transportation services (scissors, 2015).
modern trade agreements address more than trade, and the tpp is no excep-
tion. the agreement has numerous provisions affecting investment, including an 
investment chapter and a separate chapter on investor-state dispute settlement of 
investment issues. one of the more important investment provisions is agreement 
on a “negative list” for accepting foreign direct investments. this means that econ-
omies are open to foreign investments except for those specifically excluded. this 
will be important as new products and services are introduced. the liberalizations 
of trade in goods and services, increased transparency of regulatory regimes, and 
improved intellectual property protections will also all foster cross-border invest-
ments (moran, oldenski, 2016). there are many derogations from the agreement by 
specific countries to shelter favored industries, however, that dilute the investment 
provisions (scissors, 2015). 
protection of foreign investments through investor-state dispute settlement 
(Isds) is a controversial part of the agreement. critics of Isds contend that it is a threat 
to the regulatory authority of governments. the tpp agreement attempts to address 
these concerns by stating specifically that member countries have the right to regulate 
for protection of health, safety, environment and cultural diversity. It also puts in place 
procedures to increase transparency in investment dispute settlement cases, and gives 
arbitrators the right to allocate costs of Isds cases as a way to discourage frivolous cases. 
It also attempts to clarify legal terms such as “fair and equitable treatment” and “indi-
rect expropriation” that have been subject to varying and sometimes conflicting inter-
pretations by arbitrators in previous Isds cases (hufbauer, 2016a).
4. INNOVATIONS IN THE TPP AGREEMENT
While provisions have been included in recent trade agreements to address 
trade-related environmental concerns, the environmental provisions of the tpp are 
more extensive than in any previous trade agreement (schott, 2016). parties to the 
agreement have committed not only to enforcing their own environmental regula-
tions, but also to enforcing the terms of multilateral environmental agreements to 
which they have subscribed. member countries undertake new obligations to pro-
tect biodiversity, prevent illegal trade in wildlife and illegally harvested wood, and to 
prevent overfishing. dispute settlement procedures for environmental issues are the 
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same as for other parts of the agreement, with trade sanctions available as enforce-
ment measures (Ustr, 2016b: article 20.23).
despite the fact that poorer countries in the agreement such as Brunei, malaysia, 
and vietnam have very different labor markets and conditions than the more eco-
nomically developed member countries, the tpp agreement goes beyond previous 
free trade agreements in extending protections to workers. not only do the member 
countries commit to enforcing their own labor laws, but also to enforcing core in-
ternational labor standards as articulated by the International labor organization: 
abolition of child labor, elimination of forced labor, freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining, and no discrimination in employment. the tpp par-
ties commit to establish minimum wages and regulation of working hours, and to 
the establishment of occupational health and safety standards (Ustr, 2016b: article 
19.3). new provisions in the tpp provide for protection of workers in foreign trade 
zones, and discourage trade in goods produced by forced labor. the language in the 
agreement is often vague, however, with a lot of regulatory discretion left to individu-
al countries (cimino-Isaacs, 2016). the labor chapter includes separate agreements 
between the United states and Brunei, malaysia, and vietnam focused on institu-
tional reform and capacity building in these countries to enable them to adhere to 
the terms agreed. the provisions of the labor chapter are subject to the same dispute 
settlement procedures as other chapters, with trade sanctions potentially available 
for enforcement. 
the telecommunications chapter of the agreement for the first time specifies 
network access rules to suppliers of mobile services that should open up competition 
in this sector, where it is often lacking. It is the first free trade agreement to address 
the issue of unreasonable mobile roaming rates that can add a significant cost to do-
ing business internationally.
the tpp agreement has several provisions aimed at strengthening the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights beyond what has previously been agreed. It re-
quires countries to have criminal sanctions for counterfeiting trademarks on a com-
mercial scale, and requires them to have civil penalties that are in accordance with 
the losses incurred for violation of any of the intellectual property provisions. since 
five of the tpp countries are on the United states trade representative’s 2016 watch 
list for having “serious intellectual property rights deficiencies,” these strengthened 
enforcement provisions would seem to be warranted.6 they will carry great weight 
in negotiations with countries such as Indonesia that have indicated an interest in 
joining the tpp.
perhaps the most controversial part of the tpp agreement is that addressing in-
tellectual property rights for pharmaceutical products. nongovernmental organiza-
tions (ngos), such as the highly respected doctors Without Borders, have expressed 
6  the named countries are canada, mexico, peru, vietnam and chile (chile is on the priority Watch list) 
(Ustr, 2016a).
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serious concerns about how the terms of the agreement might deprive poorer coun-
tries of life-saving medicines. there is an ongoing debate about how to balance the 
conflicting goals of providing medicines at reasonable cost while at the same time 
leaving adequate incentives for the development of new drugs. there are no easy 
or certain answers to this dilemma. dispassionate analysis of the terms of the tpp 
agreement and existing empirical work indicate that the consequences of the tpp 
intellectual property provisions will probably not be dire as feared by some, and in 
fact may have struck a reasonable balance (Branstetter, 2016a). among other things, 
the agreement provides 5-year protection of the data submitted to regulatory agen-
cies by pharmaceutical firms to prove the safety and efficacy of a new chemically-
synthesized drugs, and 8-year protection for those produced through biotechnology 
(known as biologics). pharmaceutical companies wanted 12-year data protection for 
biologics, while ngos advocated for 5 years, and the compromise arrived at by ne-
gotiators was 8 years. this will delay somewhat the entry of certain generic drugs, but 
the tpp agreement does not infringe upon existing safeguards that allow countries to 
override patent rights in case of public health emergencies, and poorer countries in 
the tpp are permitted to delay implementation of the provisions for up to 10 years, 
with additional delays possible depending on the circumstances. other tpp provi-
sions relating to pharmaceuticals are very similar to those of free trade agreements 
of the United states dating back to 2010. existing empirical work indicates that these 
provisions had no adverse impact on drug access or drug prices in the affected coun-
tries (Branstetter, 2016a).
particularly relevant to the 21st century, and an innovation of the tpp agree-
ment, are provisions dealing with digital trade. a digital good is defined in the 
agreement as “a computer programme, text, video, image, sound recording or oth-
er product that is digitally encoded, produced for commercial sale or distribution, 
and that can be transmitted electronically” (Ustr, 2016b: article 14.1). digital 
trade is growing much more rapidly than trade in physical goods, and most likely 
will continue to do so. the tpp extends the principle of nondiscrimination gener-
ally to digital goods, and prohibits the imposition of import duties on such prod-
ucts. tariffs can still be applied to physical goods that are purchased online, but not 
to digital goods. countries are not permitted to block foreign websites, except for 
purposes of national security or the protection of public morals. cross-border data 
flows are to be unimpeded, and parties to the agreement cannot require that local 
computing facilities be established as a condition of doing business (Branstetter, 
2016b). many services are traded via digital goods, and the volume of such transac-
tions is underestimated because they are often are not recorded in trade statistics. 
given the growing importance of digital trade, the precedents set in the tpp agree-
ment for unrestricted trade in such goods will take on increasing importance as the 
share of such goods in world trade increases, and as additional countries accede to 
the tpp.
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another important innovation of the tpp agreement, both for the present and 
with an eye to the future, is the chapter dealing with state-owned enterprises (soes). 
the provisions in the tpp agreement go beyond commitments on soes found ei-
ther in the World trade organization agreements or in other free trade agreements 
(miner, 2016). they attempt to discipline the support and protections extended by 
governments to state-owned enterprises which provide unfair advantages for them 
in international commerce, such as subsidies and regulations tailored to their ben-
efit. all of the tpp countries have some soes, but they are particularly important in 
malaysia and vietnam. Undoubtedly, the soe provisions of the tpp agreement were 
written also with the prospect in mind that china might someday apply for member-
ship. the United states and other tpp countries wanted to have rules regarding soes 
established before possible negotiations with china got underway.
soes are defined in the tpp agreement as enterprises that are engaged in com-
mercial activities and in which the state has more than 50% direct ownership, con-
trols through ownership interests more than 50% of the voting rights, or appoints 
a majority of the board of directors (or other governing body). member countries 
are to provide a list of all their soes or to post such a list on a website, and to provide 
information on specific soes if requested to do so by another member country. soes 
are prohibited from discriminating against the firms of tpp member countries, and 
their purchases and sales are to be based on commercial considerations. subsidies to 
soes that harm the firms of tpp member countries are prohibited. the soe provi-
sions in the agreement are subject to the agreement’s dispute resolution provisions, 
with trade sanctions available as enforcement measures. 
other innovations in the tpp agreement include a chapter (chapter 25) on 
regulatory coherence, the aim of which is to keep regulatory regimes from being pro-
tectionist or otherwise trade-distortive. It encourages interagency consultation and 
coordination, and promotes good regulatory practices such as impact assessment. 
chapter 26 of the agreement provides the strongest disciplines ever on transparency 
and anti-corruption. tpp countries are required to provide readily accessible infor-
mation about laws, rules and regulations concerning trade and investment within 
their borders. they are also required to have and enforce anti-bribery laws and to 
guarantee due process rights. according to the United states trade representative, 
chapter 27 which deals with administrative and institutional provisions for the first 
time in a trade agreement requires the member countries to present plans and report 
on their progress for putting into effect the measures for which transition periods 
have been agreed.7
7  “for the first time in a trade agreement, the tpp requires parties to report on their plan and progress 
in implementing those measures for which they have negotiated implementation transition periods. 
these transition periods support the development objectives of the tpp by providing lower-income tpp 
countries additional time to build capacity in specific agreed areas. through the reporting requirements, 
parties can monitor progress, address problems, and offer capacity building assistance if needed, ahead 
of the date for final implementation” (Ustr, 2016c).
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5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TPP AGREEMENT
there has been an ongoing debate concerning whether regional trade agree-
ments such as the tpp are, on balance, good or bad for the world trading system. 
eminent international economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati have argued that they 
are discriminatory by nature, that they needlessly complicate the international trad-
ing system, and that they divert energies and attention from efforts to liberalize trade 
multilaterally (Bhagwati, 1998). others, such as c. fred Bergsten, argue that progress 
on difficult issues at the regional level can provide a template for progress along the 
same lines in multilateral negotiations, as the north american free trade agreement 
seemed to do for the Uruguay round negotiations during the 1990s. (Bergsten, 1996) 
Where does the tpp agreement lie along this spectrum?
as delineated in the paragraphs above, the provisions of the tpp agreement 
break new ground in areas where progress has not yet been possible in multilateral 
negotiations. While still limited, significant progress was made in opening agricul-
tural markets to increased competition. market access for other goods and services 
was also pushed beyond what has been accomplished through the Wto. tpp coun-
tries agreed to significant liberalization of their investment regimes. labor and en-
vironmental protections were extended even beyond those of the more advanced re-
gional agreements. rules designed to keep digital trade unrestricted and to strength-
en protections for intellectual property could well provide a template for future mul-
tilateral negotiations. disciplines on the activities of state-owned enterprises go well 
beyond those of previous regional or multilateral agreements, and very likely will be 
adopted more broadly in future negotiations. the main goal of international trade 
agreements is to provide a predictable legal and commercial framework for trade and 
investment through rules that are mutually advantageous. the tpp agreement makes 
real progress in that regard.
nevertheless, there are shortcomings in the agreement that could be stumbling 
blocks for future trade talks. Being a free trade agreement rather than a customs un-
ion, the tpp has rules of origin to prevent trade deflection. the complexity of the 
rules and the requirement for ninety-percent within-tpp content for duty-free ac-
cess places a burden on traders, especially small businesses. If and when new mem-
bers are added to the tpp, the rules of origin will become even more complex. of 
course, in multilateral trade talks this would not be an issue since the most-favored-
nation principle would prevail and rules of origin would not be necessary. that some 
firms choose to pay import tariffs rather than go through the trouble and expense 
of satisfying rule of origin requirements clearly demonstrates their trade-distorting 
character.
another troubling aspect of the tpp agreement is the number of nonconform-
ing measures that exempt countries from particular provisions of the agreement. 
these are particularly onerous for financial and transportation services (scissors, 
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2015). the extent of the nonconforming measures allowed make it likely that future 
members of the agreement will insist on such exemptions as well to protect their 
preferred sectors. 
also, the very long phase-in periods permitted for removal of restrictions on 
some agricultural and automotive products detract from the potential benefits of the 
agreement. While these may have been necessary in politically sensitive sectors for 
concluding the negotiations, an unfortunate precedent has been set for future nego-
tiations at either the regional of multilateral level. 
6. CONCLUSION
on balance, while it is far from a perfect agreement, the tpp agreement should 
serve as a template for progress on a number of issues in the world trading system. at 
the very least, it will upgrade and modernize the provisions of the trade agreements 
that already exist among several of the tpp countries. It seems already to be influenc-
ing the negotiations led by china for a regional cooperation and economic partner-
ship that the participants hope to conclude in 2017. some of its provisions will likely 
be adopted in the transatlantic trade and Investment partnership negotiations now 
underway between the United states and the european Union. a possible blending 
of these three mega-regional trade agreements (should they come to fruition) some-
time in the future could set the stage for the next multilateral agreement under the 
auspices of the World trade organization.
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